Ramadi; 2006…the Marines and soldiers were taking heavy casualties in what had been dubbed “the most deadly city in the world.” The television news seemed to have a daily ticker scrolling “Marine killed today in Ramadi,” every morning, and in August the Washington Post reported that Marine intelligence officer Col Peter Devlin submitted a classified intelligence report saying that the American military had lost control of Anbar Province to Al Qaeda.
But within a year, Ramadi and Anbar Province were being hailed as ‘the’ example of American success in stabilizing Iraq, and in “A Chance in Hell,” author Jim Michaels provides a gripping tale of how a few determined individuals turned the tide of battle.
Unlike Fallujah or An-Nasiriyah which were battles of a set duration, the battle for Ramadi was fought over a space of three years, with the lead units being a mix of 1st MEF, 2nd MEF, Pennsylvania National Guard, and regular Army. With so many unit and so many individual heroic actions on which to write, Michaels made the decision to emphasize the individuals most responsible for the turn-around; Army Col Sean MacFarland, Sheik Sattar Abu-Risha, and MajGen Richard Zilmer, USMC.
Michaels is a superb storyteller, and as both a former Marine infantry officer and USA Today’s military editor, has the skills to present a story in a manner that is both accurate and readable. And what a story it is.
MacFarland was the commanding officer of the Army’s “Ready First” (First Brigade, First Armored Division), that arrived Ramadi in May 2006, under the command of 1st Mar Div’s MajGen Richard Zilmer. The city was in chaos; the Pentagon had sent the Pennsylvania National Guard to control Ramadi and while the Guardsmen fought hard, they lacked the resources to conduct a proper urban fight. “These were Pennsylvania coal miners,” said Devlin, “and they were duking it out and holding their own.” But barely holding their own…their Camp Corregidor was under such daily siege that six soldiers had been killed inside the base by indirect fire, and flaks and kevlars were needed in order to reach the chow hall or make a head call.
Clearly an unsustainable strategy, as Zilmer and MacFarland both knew. Ramadi was an economy of force mission in the eyes of the Bush Administration, and as MEF intelligence officer Maj Ben Connable quickly learned after working with MNF-I staff “most of us (had)bought into the line that commanders get what they ask for. That was a blatant lie.” The only direction coming from Washington was to turn responsibility for Iraqi security over to the Iraqi’s so American troops could come home; Zilmer and MacFarland were on their own.
Employing the Marine concept of ‘Commanders Intent,” Zilmer gave MacFarland huge autonomy. “Fix Ramadi,” he was told, “but don’t do a Fallujah.”
Also newly arrived in Ramadi was 1st Bn, 6th Marines, led by LtCol William Jurney. Headquartered at Hurricane Point in western Ramadi, Jurney’s Marines were responsible for security in the city, including the Government Center. An island of Marine defiance in central Ramadi as the insurgency swirled around it, the “Gov Center” was attacked by mortars, RPG’s, and SAF daily as both the American public and the local population waited to see if the Marines and soldiers were going to regain control of the city from AQI. The locals hated the Americans, MacFarland and Jurney quickly discovered, but they feared Al-Qada – and the American military had shown itself incapable of protecting them.
One of the locals was Sheik Sattar abu-Risha, a minor sheik from a minor tribe. But with the more important sheiks having fled to Jordan along with AQI having killed his father and three of his four brothers; Sattar was quietly cultivating the Americans in order to gain revenge. Zilmer and MacFarland understood the tribes were the key to Anbar, so with Zilmer’s approval, MacFarland and his staff began to co-operate with Sattar and his new group, the Anbar Awakening.
Michaels weaves a story that includes CPT Travis Patriquin, of the famous stick-figure powerpoint, Marine Major Megan McLung, and the other Marine and Army officers who helped make the turn-about possible. He also includes the American interpreters and intelligence officers who worked with Sattar, giving the reader the most complete view of this most interesting individual.
Those readers expecting a Marine-centric view of Ramadi may be disappointed; Ramadi was not a Marine-exclusive operation, and Michaels takes pains to portray this.. But for all readers, and especially those many Marines who fought from OP VA, OP Hawk, and 17th Street, “A Chance in Hell” is a most interesting story of how a few entrepreneurial officers and a charismatic sheik developed the strategy that took back Ramadi and was adopted by Gen David Petraeus as the backbone of his ‘surge’ strategy.
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